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FOREWORD
It is common to hear the argument that military
organizations are incapable of reforming themselves.
In this paper, Lieutenant Colonel Suzanne Nielsen
takes the opposite position. It is not only possible for
senior military leaders to change their organizations,
it is also necessary since only these leaders are likely
to be able to do it.
To explain what it takes, she examines the transformation of the U.S. Army as it went from being an
institution in distress in the late 1960s and early 1970s
during the Vietnam War, to being the organization
that demonstrated tactical and operational excellence
in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. While this paper does
not examine the causes of success or failure in these
two wars, which clearly exist on multiple levels, it does
argue that the U.S. Army that fought in the latter was
a very changed organization. It was the beneficiary of
a program of interrelated and integrated reforms in
the areas of personnel policy, organization, doctrine,
training, and equipment modernization. While political leaders and other external factors established challenges and constraints, it was the uniformed leaders
within the organization who crafted and implemented
the detailed programs of reform that transformed the
Army.
At the end of the first decade of the 21st century,
the Army and the other Armed Services again face
the need to change to become more capable of meeting the country’s national security needs given new
strategic, economic, and technological realities. While
change remains difficult, it is useful to know what can
be garnered from past success. To this end, the Strate-
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gic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this analysis
as part of our Letort Papers series.
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SUMMARY
During the 2 decades preceding the Persian Gulf
War in 1991, the U.S. Army went through tremendous
reform and rejuvenation. It recovered from the Vietnam War, transitioned to an all-volunteer personnel
model, and refocused on a potential future war against
a very capable adversary in Europe. The Army’s
transformation was evident to external observers:
from being seen as an organization in distress in the
early 1970s, by 1991 the Army became an organization
whose professionalism was the source of admiration.
Drawing on the relevant literature, the author seeks to
explain this important case of military change.
This paper makes four central arguments. First,
leaders within military organizations are essential; external developments most often have an indeterminate
impact on military change. Second, military reform is
about more than changing doctrine. To implement
its doctrine, an organization must have appropriate
training practices, personnel policies, organizations,
equipment, and leader development programs. Third,
the implementation of comprehensive change requires an organizational entity with broad authority
able to craft, evaluate, and execute an integrated program of reforms. In the case of the U.S. Army in the
1970s and 1980s, this organization was the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). To an
unprecedented degree, TRADOC was able to ensure
that changes in personnel policies, organizations,
doctrine, training practices, and equipment were integrated and mutually reinforcing. Finally, the process
of developing, implementing, and institutionalizing
complementary reforms can take several decades.
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This suggests that stability in an organization’s mission and resources can be important.
Despite the many beneficial reforms implemented
by senior uniformed leaders during this time period,
there are at least two important criticisms that must be
addressed. The first is that the Army failed to retain
the professional knowledge about counterinsurgency
it had gained at a high price in Vietnam; the second is
that the Army attained tactical and operational excellence but failed to develop leaders well-suited to helping political leaders attain strategic success. While
these criticisms have merit, it is difficult to examine
the progress made by the Army in the 1970s and 1980s
and claim that the reforms that made it possible were
not beneficial. At most, one might say that they did
not go far enough.
While today’s demands differ from those of the
past, this paper suggests questions that may be useful in thinking about change today. What are the key
constraints or parameters that civilian policymakers
have established for uniformed military leaders? Do
political and military leaders have a constructive relationship which facilitates the implementation of a
coherent program of change? Is there an integrated
approach within the Army that reaches into all key
areas of force development and guides them in ways
that are integrated and mutually reinforcing? Is there
an organizational entity empowered and capable of
being the focal point for establishing coherence in developments ranging from equipment modernization
and doctrine to training and education? Knowing the
answers to these questions would enable informed
judgment about the prospects for the successful implementation of a program of reforms. The consequences,
for good or for ill, could be quite significant in terms of
resources, lives, and the national interest.
viii

AN ARMY TRANSFORMED:
THE U.S. ARMY’S POST-VIETNAM RECOVERY
AND THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE
IN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
In the early 1970s, the books that were being published about the U.S. Armed Forces, and particularly
the Army, had titles such as: Army in Anguish, America’s
Army in Crisis, Crisis in Command, Defeated, and even
The Death of the Army: A Pre-Mortem.1 The common
phenomenon to be explained in each of these works is
the poor state of the U.S. Army. In the 1990s, after the
Persian Gulf War, books about the U.S. Armed Forces
and the Army had titles such as Getting it Right, and
Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of
Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War.2 Instead of focusing on the Army’s problems, the puzzle
that authors in the 1990s address is the strength of this
“formidable professional organization.”3 These books
attempt to trace the Army’s effectiveness to its source,
rather than to address its problems; the contrast with
the literature on the Army of the 1970s is significant
and dramatic.
This sea change in writing about the Army reflects
the fact that, during the years between the Vietnam
War and the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. Army
went through a period of tremendous change. This
was an important period in which the Army recovered from Vietnam and refocused on a potential future war against a very capable adversary in Europe.
In the process, the Army saw important reforms in
its personnel policies, organization, doctrine, training
practices, and equipment modernization. The effects
of these reforms were magnified as they were implemented in an integrated and mutually reinforcing
manner.
1

Given the significant weight and role of the United
States in international affairs and the importance of
the military instrument of power in U.S. foreign and
security policy, the resulting improvements in U.S.
Army fighting capabilities were of great importance.
However, despite the titles mentioned above, the
literature on military change does not yet contain a
systematic effort to explain this important case in a
comprehensive fashion. This monograph seeks to fill
this gap, while also informing ongoing debates about
the dynamics that are likely to characterize successful
military reform efforts.
Before turning to the specifics of this case, it is useful to survey what the existing literature offers those
seeking to understand military change. Three issues
are addressed in the next section. The first relates to
the difficulties that may be associated with efforts to
change military organizations. Historically speaking,
it is certainly true that military organizations have developed new capabilities or improved existing ones in
ways that have greatly improved their effectiveness
when put to the test. However, it is also true that military organizations do not constantly, or even always,
improve. For this reason, it is valuable to identify some
of the challenges that stand in the way of attempts to
change military institutions. Building on an appreciation that progress cannot be taken for granted, the second issue relates to explaining changes that do occur.
Though valuable generalizations exist, these propositions do not fully explain the changes that took place
in the U.S. Army from the Vietnam era through the
1980s, and therefore a new approach is needed. Finally, the existing literature leaves unresolved a number of important debates that shape explanations for
military change. An appreciation for these debates
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provides valuable context for understanding the contributions and limitations of various explanations of
military change.
Informed by this groundwork, change in the U.S.
Army in the 1970s and 1980s is then examined. This
case lends support to four central arguments about
processes of military change. First, leaders within
military organizations are essential; developments external to military organizations most often have an indeterminate impact. Political leaders’ interpretations
of the international environment, and their decisions
on issues such as the military budget and conscription, shape the parameters within which military leaders act. However, military leaders play an important
role in determining how to manage these challenges
and constraints and develop the specific programs
and policies that shape military institutions in important ways. Second, military change is about more
than doctrine. For a military organization to be able
to implement its doctrine, it must have appropriate
training practices, personnel policies, organizations,
equipment, and leader development programs. Therefore, attempts to implement a comprehensive reform
agenda must be supported by critical analytical work
which logically relates developments in each of these
areas. Third, as a related issue, the implementation
of comprehensive change requires an organizational
entity with broad authority over the development of
the entire organization. Finally, the process of developing and implementing peacetime military changes
can take several decades. Therefore, stability in an organization’s mission and resources can be important.
Though dissimilarities are numerous and significant, the first decade of the 21st century is similar to
the Vietnam War years in that both periods proved to

3

be very challenging for the U.S. Army. Both periods
saw enormous operational demands being placed on
the Army, and in both there were vigorous debates
about what the Army of the future should look like.
Even as the Army of today remains involved in ongoing combat and stability operations, those charged
with shaping the force for the future could benefit
from reflecting on what can be learned from past success.
MILITARY CHANGE IS DIFFICULT
Instituting change in military organizations is both
difficult and potentially very important. It is important
because, given the nature of war itself, military organizations must adapt to remain effective in a dynamic
environment. This environment contains at least four
important sources of change. The first of these is political. Carl von Clausewitz is famous for writing “war
is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”4
He goes on to say that “policy, then, will permeate
all military operations, and, in so far as their violent
nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence
on them.”5 One implication of these ideas is that the
nature of war will be altered as relations among states
evolve and changes in policy occur. Second, Clausewitz observes that social changes significantly affect
the character of war. Clausewitz’s recognition of this
factor can be seen in his discussion of the changes
that the French Revolution brought to warfare by involving the popular masses.6 Finally, two additional
dynamics that affect the nature of war are economic
development and technological change—two issues
Clausewitz has been criticized for not adequately addressing.7 In sum, the nature of warfare can be altered
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by political, social, economic, and technological developments and military organizations must adapt to
remain effective. Not all changes are good, but stagnation can easily become problematic.
Given that change is important, why is it difficult
to institute in military organizations? It is possible to
gain a better understanding of the issues at stake by
looking at three aspects of military institutions: their
status as large organizations, their status as government bureaucracies, and finally their unique characteristics due to the fact that their central task is to
manage organized violence for the political purposes
of the state.8
The Military As A Large Organization.
Perhaps the best known set of propositions about
organizational behavior is the Organizational Process
Model originally developed by Graham Allison in Essence of Decision, and refined by Allison and Phillip
Zelikow in the second edition of that book. One of the
model’s central predictions is that, “The best explanation of an organization’s behavior at t is t – 1; the best
prediction of what will happen at t + 1 is t.”9 A major
challenge that large organizations face is the coordination of the efforts of large numbers of people. For
this reason, it is rational for organizations to develop
standard ways of doing business, or standard operating procedures (SOPs), to facilitate this coordination.
At higher levels of aggregation, these SOPs form part
of programs, which together constitute an organization’s repertoire of existing capabilities. As Allison
and Zelikow argue, “Since procedures are ‘standard,’
they do not change quickly or easily.”10 Change is not
only difficult, but also problematic because it cuts
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against the mechanisms designed to keep the organization functioning smoothly. These factors lead to the
general expectation of continuity rather than change
in organizational behavior.
In addition to the need for SOPs, Allison and Zelikow mention three additional factors that can work
to inhibit organizational change. First, leaders may be
influenced to favor the status quo by organizational
culture. Organizational culture, simply defined, consists of an organization’s formally and informally expressed understandings of how it is to fulfill its functions and what functions are appropriate for it. The
existence of a strong organizational culture, like the
existence of SOPs, can serve the functional purpose of
helping to coordinate the activities of large numbers
of people toward a common purpose.11 However, organizational culture can also serve to constrain the options that leaders of organizations consider.
Three authors who have focused on culture when
examining constraints on military change are Elizabeth Kier, Morton Halperin, and Andrew Krepinevich. Organizational culture is a major component of
Kier’s explanation in her book, Imagining War, for the
lack of doctrinal innovation in the British and French
armies prior to World War II.12 Halperin similarly
captures the possible impact of organizational culture
in his discussion of “organizational essence.” He argues that organizational leaders will resist change that
threatens their view of the appropriate missions and
capabilities of their organization.13 Finally, Krepinevich argues that adherence to the “Army Concept” inhibited the ability of the Army to adapt to the demands
of the Vietnam War. This concept called for the Army
to focus on mid-intensity, conventional war, and rely
heavily on firepower to keep casualties down. This vi-
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sion of the appropriate way of war prevented the U.S.
Army from adopting appropriate counterinsurgency
tactics in Vietnam.14
Although these authors see organizational culture
as constraining change, this would not necessarily
have to be the case. One possible counter-example is
the German Army in the years leading up to World
War II. According to military historian Williamson
Murray, throughout the interwar period the German
Army had a “culture of critical examination” that enabled it to not only learn the lessons of World War
I, but to continue learning during exercises and during the early combat operations of World War II. In
addition, the German Army’s culture was characterized by a high degree of trust between levels of command. This trust enabled learning by making it easier
to openly acknowledge deficiencies and by ensuring
that failures were examined for learning points rather
than used as a source of punishment.15
A third factor, in addition to SOPs and culture,
which may inhibit change is the interest that organizational leaders have in the status quo. A strong statement about the incentives of senior leaders to resist
change can be found in Barry Posen’s discussion of
doctrinal innovation. He argues that one of the reasons that military organizations will normally stagnate when left alone is that “individuals develop a
vested interest in the distribution of power and in the
purpose it protects. Generally, it is not in the interests
of most of an organization’s members to promote or
succumb to radical change.”16 The following passage
from Allison and Zelikow captures these two ideas
and further suggests their relevance to the military
context:
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The military services are manned by careerists on a
structured ladder. Promotion to higher rungs is dependent on years of demonstrated, distinguished devotion to a service’s mission. Work routines, patterns
of association, and information channels . . . make
quite predictable a service’s continual search for new
hardware consistent with currently assigned roles and
missions.17

The implication is that senior uniformed leaders,
who have been socialized by the system that has also
recognized them with promotion to the highest ranks,
would be unlikely to advocate change. As Carl Builder points out, in the U.S. military services, culture
and material interests can combine to form “masks
of war” through which the services see threats. “The
advocates for a particular kind of military instrument
can hardly be faulted (at least in peacetime) if their
interpretations of the threat—and the effectiveness of
a particular military system to counter it—reflects the
interests of their institutions and the importance of
their chosen careers.”18
A final factor that may impede organizational
change is an interest in avoiding uncertainty. Allison
and Zelikow argue that organizational leaders will try
to minimize uncertainty in two ways. The first is to
attempt to create a “negotiated environment” around
themselves within which organizational leaders can
“maximize autonomy and regularize the reactions of
other actors with whom they must deal.”19 A second
approach is relevant to an organization’s relationship
with the outside world that cannot be managed in this
way. In this case, Allison and Zelikow argue, organizations respond to uncertainty by running standard
scenarios.20 That organizations desire to reduce uncertainty is another key point of agreement between
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Allison and Zelikow and Posen, and is a second key
reason why Posen believes that military doctrine will
stagnate if militaries are left on their own.21 If minimizing uncertainty is a reasonable goal for organizational
leaders, it may also be a factor that militates against
change.
The previous section has discussed the following
four general characteristics of military organizations:
standardization, culture, vested interests, and uncertainty avoidance. As discussed above with regard to
organizational culture, these factors may not always
militate against change. In their critique of Allison’s
models, Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond argue that Allison downplays the dynamism of large
organizations and their ability to take on complicated challenges.22 Nevertheless, in any given situation
these organizational attributes may serve as obstacles
to change.
The Military As A Bureaucracy.
Although Allison and Zelikow usefully point out
the elements that militaries have in common with
all large organizations, military organizations are
also government bureaucracies. As James Q. Wilson
points out, government executives operate in a realm
of unique constraints that affect their ability to implement change. In contrast to the executives of private
firms, government executives can neither allocate the
factors of production, nor can they entirely set their
own goals:
Control over revenues, productive factors, and agency
goals is all vested to an important degree in entities
external to the organization—legislatures, courts, poli-
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ticians and interest groups . . . whereas business management focuses on the “bottom line” (that is, profits),
government management focuses on the “top line”
(that is, constraints).23

This lack of control can make instituting change
more difficult, and also makes salient a second factor—the importance of political support. One of the
key tasks of a federal executive is maintenance of the
organization. As Wilson points out, “In a government
agency, maintenance requires obtaining not only capital (appropriations) and labor (personnel) but in addition political support.” Political support provides
government executives the necessary autonomy to
implement change when they perceive that change is
needed. “Political support is at its highest when the
agency’s goals are popular, its tasks simple, its rivals
non-existent, and the constraints minimal.” Unfortunately, these conditions do not often apply to government agencies.24
In The Defense Game, Richard A. Stubbing discusses
how these factors play out in the making of U.S. defense policy. Ideally, one would like to see some coherent link between the country’s national security
strategy and defense program and policy decisions. In
the first portion of his book, Stubbing explains why a
high degree of coherence is not necessarily to be expected in the United States:
At stake in our defense program is not only our national security, but also large opportunities for personal
and economic success. Congressmen favor programs
and facilities in their states and districts regardless of
efficiency. Industry officials seek to boost their sales
and profits, ofttimes at the expense of the government
and the taxpayer. Military officers seek promotion
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and advancement under accepted standards of performance, which often conflict with hard-nosed business
practices.25

Stubbing also discusses the need for defense executives to maintain political support. He argues that
in order to remain effective, U.S. Secretaries of Defense must maintain good relations with three key
constituencies: the White House, Congress, and the
military services. Stubbing approvingly quotes James
Schlesinger, who said of the position of Secretary of
Defense that it merely constituted a “license to persuade,” with part of the ability to persuade strongly
dependent on political support.26
Though the positions of the uniformed leaders of
military services in relation to their own services are
perhaps a bit stronger, much the same could be said
of them. Their key constituencies include civilian political leaders in the executive branch (who may be
unified or divided), members of Congress, and other
senior officers within their services. At this level, key
leaders still face resource constraints and need political support.
The Special Nature Of Military Organizations.
The preceding paragraphs have argued that changing military organizations can be difficult because of
the potential built-in resistance to change characteristic of all large organizations and because of unique
constraints on their leaders that derive from their status as government bureaucracies. In addition to impediments raised by these aspects of military institutions, obstacles to change are posed by their unique
function. Military organizations operate in an envi-
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ronment fraught with uncertainty. During peacetime,
they do not fulfill their essential functions on a daily
basis. Instead, they merely prepare to fulfill those functions. This can make change more difficult because
until military organizations face operational tests, it
is difficult to judge existing organizational structures
and practices—let alone the value of alternatives. Although wargaming and simulation can help, the best
of these still only approximate the conditions of future
combat and the results of the interaction of friendly
and enemy forces.27 Since it is impossible to eliminate
uncertainty when arguing that change will enhance
future prospects of victory, and the potential for unforeseen side effects exists, there is often not an obviously right answer to particular military problems.
Second, the stakes involved in military change are
uniquely high, given that military organizations perform their essential tasks in an environment of at least
potential violence.28 Military leaders may hesitate to
abandon “tried-and-true” weapon systems, organizations, or tactics in favor of new approaches that may—
in their view—unnecessarily put lives at risk. As an
example, armor commanders that enjoyed the protection of the M1 Abrams Tank during the Persian Gulf
War in 1991 may be reluctant to abandon that system
in favor of more lightly armored vehicles and new
concepts of force protection that rely on less proven
technologies and systems. At a higher level of analysis, the stakes involved could be as significant as national survival. Changes to military organizations that
are dramatic and revolutionary are also the most dangerous and the most likely to be seen as irresponsible
gambles with the country’s defense. So, in addition to
the challenges facing the executives of all bureaucracies, senior military leaders face additional uncertain-
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ties as to the worth of particular changes and may pay
a high price in terms of lives and mission success for
getting it wrong.
Types Of Military Change.
To this point, I have been a bit vague on the definition of “change.” The reason is that the above obstacles stand in the way of most efforts to change military
organizations. However, because these obstacles may
impact on different types of change in distinct ways,
it is useful to further distinguish among two types of
change: innovation and reform. The latter of these is
the focus of this paper.
Military innovation has been defined differently
by various authors, but the most useful here is the
definition Stephen Rosen sets forth in Winning the
Next War. In Rosen’s work, innovation consists of “a
change in one of the primary combat arms of a service
in the way it fights or alternatively, as the creation of
a new combat arm.”29 The U.S. Armed Forces are divided into services—the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marines—which are then in turn divided into different specialties. Here Rosen focuses only on “primary
combat arms,” which for an army reasonably includes
infantry, armor, field artillery, and perhaps combat
aviation. Rosen’s definition means that for innovation
to take place, one of these branches either needs to
fundamentally alter its approach to warfighting, or a
new combat arms branch must be created.
One can imagine that all of the challenges mentioned above may be operative in the case of military
innovation. However, as Rosen points out, there is an
additional crucial obstacle. Innovation is difficult because it requires a new theory of victory rather than
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merely incremental improvements against existing
measures of success. It also requires institutionalization, which necessitates the development of promising career paths for specialists in the new way of war.
In order to have the political power in the military to
create these pathways, innovators must have the credibility that comes with traditional service credentials.
In sum, “peacetime military innovation occurs when
respected senior military leaders formulate a strategy
for innovation that has both intellectual and organizational components.”30
The concept of reform differs from Rosen’s definition of innovation in that it encompasses a broader
range of potential changes. As the term is used here, a
reform is an improvement in or the creation of a significant new program or policy that is intended to correct an identified deficiency. Therefore, reform does
not necessarily entail adjustments to an organization’s
core tasks. It also does not necessarily require the visualization of new ways of warfare, or the development
of new measures of effectiveness. A third distinction
between the two concepts is suggested by Williamson
Murray who uses an alternative terminology. Instead
of “innovation” and “reform,” Murray uses the terms
“revolutionary innovation” and “evolutionary innovation.” Murray’s “revolutionary innovation” is similar to Rosen’s “innovation” in the sense that both give
great weight to the role of key individuals. Reform,
as discussed here, is similar to evolutionary innovation in that it “depends on organizational focus over a
sustained period of time rather than on one particular
individual’s capacity to guide the path of innovation
for a short period of time.”31
Those who would attempt either innovation or
reform face the challenges mentioned above: the difficulty in changing standard ways of doing things
14

in large organizations, as well as obstacles posed by
organizational culture, vested interests, and the need
to manage uncertainty; the particular problems that
executives in federal bureaucracies face because of the
need for political support which interacts with a lack
of control over resources; and finally the performance
uncertainties and high costs of failure especially associated with militaries. Some reforms will face more
resistance than others, and Wilson’s insight that reforms that threaten existing managerial relationships
will be most resisted is probably useful in attempting
to predict the degree of resistance.32 Nevertheless, all
change is difficult, which goes a long way in explaining why it is that military organizations do not constantly improve—even incrementally.
THE LITERATURE ON MILITARY CHANGE
Despite all that has been said above, it is, of course,
true that military organizations change. In the introduction to an anthology that reviews the experiences
of major industrialized countries during the interwar
period, editors Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett challenge the picture of military stagnation altogether. Their study assumes, on the contrary, that:
Innovation is natural and the result of a dynamic environment in which organizations must accept change
if they are to survive. While the period of 1918 to 1939
was technically one of peace, the future combatants
engaged, especially as war approached, in intellectual
and technological jockeying and sought advantages in
materiel and doctrine.33

Although the contributing authors hesitate to draw
explicit “lessons learned” about innovation, their cas15

es paint a rich picture of change across the military
organizations of different countries in this peacetime
period.34 So, despite all the obstacles, military institutions adapt and adjust. This section will review existing approaches to understanding military change, and
group these studies into four categories based on their
central focus: military innovation, military doctrine,
civil-military relations, and technological change. This
review will acknowledge contributions of these perspectives, while also arguing that the case of the U.S.
Army in the 1970s and early 1980s indicates the need
for a new approach.
Innovation.
A first way of examining military change is to
focus on innovation, with innovation defined (as it
is above) as consisting of an alteration of core tasks.
This is the manner in which Rosen looks at peacetime
military change in Winning the Next War, and also adequately describes the focus of many of the chapters
in the anthology edited by Williamson and Millett.35
This approach contributes to an understanding of
peacetime military change through its explanation of
the conditions under which military institutions develop the capability to conduct new ways of warfare.
However, this approach has limitations when applied
to the post-Vietnam U.S. Army of the 1970s and early
1980s. In this period, the Army’s core task—defined as
high intensity, conventional conflict—remained constant. No new combat arms branches were created,
and concepts governing the employment of existing
branches were adjusted rather than reconceived.
While it is useful to draw a clear distinction between
the concepts of innovation and reform, two other key
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points should be made. First, it is not necessarily the
case that innovation is something that has a rapid impact, and reform only bears fruit after a long period
of time. The cases of successful peacetime innovation
in the United States which Rosen examines include:
amphibious warfare (1905-40); carrier aviation (191843); and helicopter mobility (1944-65).36 Although the
transformation in the Army’s use of helicopters occurred most quickly, each of these innovations took
decades to be institutionalized. Similarly, there may
be a lengthy lag time between the decision to implement reforms and when these reforms have their impact. Organizations such as the U.S. Army do not turn
on a dime; change takes time.
The second point is that it is not necessarily the
case that innovation will prove more beneficial or
consequential than reform. Both types of change have
the potential to noticeably change organizational capabilities, and this is especially true of reforms in various programs when they are integrated and mutually
reinforcing as they were in the U.S. Army in the 1970s.
Military Doctrine.
A second approach is to look at a single facet of
military organizations and attempt to explain change
using comparative cases drawn from either different
military institutions, or from the same military institution over time. The aspect of military organizations most commonly studied in this way is military
doctrine. Three scholars who have contributed in this
area include Barry Posen, Elizabeth Kier, and Kimberly Zisk. In The Sources of Military Doctrine, Posen
uses comparative case studies and propositions from
organization theory and balance of power theory to
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explain doctrinal innovation in the armed services of
Britain, France, and Germany in the interwar period.
In Imagining War, Kier investigates the power of cultural factors in explaining change in the British and
French armed services in the same period. A third
example is Zisk’s book, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991.
Rather than investigating cases drawn from different
countries, Zisk examines cases drawn from the same
military institution across time.37
Without a clear definition of what is meant by military doctrine, it is possible to either overstate or understate its importance.38 According to the Department
of Defense (DoD), doctrine consists of “fundamental
principles by which the military forces or elements
thereof guide their actions in support of national
objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment
in application.”39 Doctrine’s potential importance is
based on the fact that it constitutes an organization’s
formal articulation of its understanding as to how it
will fight the next war. For this reason, examinations
of military doctrine and the dynamics that shape it
make a valuable contribution. However, an examination of doctrine alone will not tell the whole story.
In his doctoral thesis, Kevin Sheehan looks at postWorld War II changes in U.S. Army doctrine. He examines three cases of peacetime doctrinal change: the
Pentomic Division Concept in the 1950s, the development of active defense in the 1970s, and the creation
of Airland Battle doctrine in the early 1980s.40 In his
study, Sheehan seeks to determine what role doctrine played in the U.S. Army, to understand why it
changed so frequently in a time of peace, and to draw
some conclusions about what role it ought to play to
maximize the effectiveness of the Army.41 What is most
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relevant to the discussion here is that it is possible to
read these and other accounts of doctrinal change in
the U.S. Army in this period and not appreciate the
extent to which the organization was undergoing a
process of reform and revitalization. Doctrine is part
of the story, but it is not the whole story. Sheehan himself makes this clear in his explanation of the potential
significance of military doctrine:
In theory, doctrine constitutes the framework through
which army leaders convert inputs (soldiers, officers,
ammunition, plans, equipment, etc.) into outputs (success in battle and, ultimately, in war); it tells armies
how to prepare for and win its battles, campaigns,
and wars. . . . Armies come to believe that having the
‘right’ doctrine is a prerequisite for military success—
but, as we have suggested, the history books and conventional wisdom suggest that they rarely do.42

The fact that doctrine serves as a guide for the
broader development of armies in theory does not
mean that this always occurs in practice. It was the
integration of different reforms, in doctrine as well
as in other areas, which allowed the Army to begin
the process of rebuilding in the 1970s. A solid understanding of military change in this period requires an
examination of doctrine as well as reforms in areas
such as personnel management, training, and equipment modernization, and the manner in which these
reforms were linked and became mutually reinforcing.
Civil-Military Relations and Military Change.
A third approach seeks to explain the propensity
for military organizations to change as either a prod-
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uct of different political structures, or as a result of civilian choices as to delegation of authority and monitoring mechanisms. These approaches have their roots
in the discipline of economics and principal-agent
theory, where political leaders are the principals and
their task is to get their military agents to perform in
a desired way. The principal-agent approach usefully
calls attention to the fact that military leaders at the
highest level operate in a realm of constraints, serving some purposes established by others while also
trying to meet organizational needs. It also provokes
an examination of the potential importance of civilian
leaders in motivating or directing change in military
institutions.43 As discussed above, some analysts see
civilian involvement as necessary to the prevention of
military stagnation.44
Two scholars who have done work in this area are
Deborah Avant and Peter Feaver. They have applied
adaptations of the principal-agent framework to derive predictions about both military responsiveness
and civilian control. In Political Institutions and Military
Change, Avant looks at the experiences of the British
and American armies in counterinsurgency warfare
and finds that domestic institutions hold the key to
explaining differences in the effectiveness of these two
organizations. The structure of domestic institutions
(united or divided) affects the bias of military organizations and also indicates the type of civilian intervention that will be likely to prompt military change. In
Avant’s cases, these two factors determine how readily military organizations will adapt doctrine to meet
new circumstances.45 Feaver also uses the principalagent framework, but he focuses less on the issue of a
divided or united principal and more on the forms of
delegation and monitoring civilian leaders embrace.
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In one application of this approach, Feaver develops
a game theoretic model and uses it to explain the
1990s “crisis” in U.S. civil-military relations through
its predictions about friction in the civil-military relationship.46 That same model also makes predictions
about military compliance, which is the focus Feaver
himself ascribes to the work.47 Feaver further develops
his argument about the importance of delegation and
monitoring mechanisms, and the understanding they
provide about the state of American civil-military relations and civilian control, in a later book.48
As mentioned above, these contributions point
to the potential importance of the nexus between
uniformed officers and civilian leaders as a possible
source of military change. However, these approaches
have limitations that particularly come to light when
exploring the changes that took place in the U.S. Army
in the 1970s. The pride of place that the principalagent approach gives to the role of the civilian principal can be a source of weakness for several reasons.
First, political leaders often lack the incentive to spend
a large portion of their time and energy on military
issues. The internal workings of the military services
and their problems may be below the noise level for
political leaders managing multiple areas of concern.
Second, even if military issues do grab their attention,
civilian political leaders may lack the expertise, confidence, or will to direct specific solutions. If just being
informed has costs, then the sustained attention needed to ensure that changes are actually implemented
consumes even greater resources. As one example of
this phenomenon, even when President John F. Kennedy made the development of counterinsurgency
capabilities in the Army a personal priority, the Army
failed to move in this direction in a meaningful way.49
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Third, a focus on the civil-military relationship as the
source of change underestimates the possibility that
military leaders will take the initiative in identifying
the need for change and acting upon that need. Fourth
and perhaps most importantly, the principal-agent
framework presumes that the principal knows what
it wants and the problem is to get the agent to comply faithfully. In the realm of military policy, this may
only be true in a very rough sense.
In the case of the Army in the 1970s and early
1980s, civilian leaders played a variety of roles in the
process of change. At times they provided constraints
that gave further impetus for change, at times they
served as partners in change, and at times they made
change more difficult. The argument that will be developed here suggests, however, that the primary determinants of the content of changes initiated in the
Army during this period came from within.
Technological Change.
Finally, military change can be seen as primarily a
product of technological advances. In search of combat advantage, military organizations embrace new
technologies and develop new ways of warfare. The
idea that developments in technology can be a key
motivator for military change seems to be particularly
compelling to some in the U.S. defense policy community, and helps to generate energy for the debate
about whether or not there is an ongoing “revolution
in military affairs” (RMA). One of the leading military
proponents of the RMA in the 1990s, Admiral William A. Owens, believed that advances in intelligence,
command and control communications, and the ability to use precision strike capability could be com-
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bined to create a “system of systems” that would give
U.S. Armed Forces a significant advantage.50 Skeptics,
on the other hand, see military discussions about the
RMA as reflective of service parochialisms and a desire to eschew undesirable forms of combat.51
In a balanced examination of the debate over the
existence of an RMA, Michael O’Hanlon provides a
useful review of the various positions and draws some
conclusions relevant to any discussion of the impact of
technological developments on military change. Specifically with regard to the current RMA, O’Hanlon
argues that some of the more extreme claims unjustifiably project the pace of advance in electronics and information systems onto other technologies, and therefore are of dubious value. One is the claim that “land
vehicles, ships, rockets, and aircraft will become drastically lighter, more fuel efficient, faster, and stealthier, making combat forces far more rapidly deployable
and lethal once deployed.”52 Instead, improvements
in these areas are much more likely to continue to be
incremental. O’Hanlon also makes a more general observation worth citing here in full:
Military revolutions are the purposeful creations of
people. They are created by a combination of technological breakthrough, institutional adaptation, and
warfighting innovation. They are not emergent properties that result accidentally or unconsciously from a
cumulative process of technological invention.53

O’Hanlon is not alone in making this point—many
RMA discussions acknowledge the importance of
changes in organizations and warfighting concepts as
well as in technology.54 Nevertheless, it is important
to keep in mind that there is nothing inevitable about
advances in technology producing advances in warfighting capability.
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A great illustration of this point is the development of radar during the interwar period. Although
the Germans had an early technical lead, they never
fully exploited this advantage. In strategic air defense,
for example, they used radar in their existing organizations to substitute for aerial observers. In other
words, radar was for the German Army primarily a
manpower saving device—it sparked neither operational nor organizational innovation. The British, on
the other hand, were technically behind the Germans
in some respects but more fully took advantage of
radar by creating an effective, centrally-directed air
defense network. As one historian notes, “This logic
contributed a winning strategy to the Battle of Britain
in 1940-41.”55
This observation that organizations and countries
differ in their ability to fully exploit new technologies
applies to broader spans of time as well. As Bernard
Brodie concludes in his historical sweep that runs
from the Napoleonic Period through World War II,
“there seems not to be any direct proportionality between technological change and military-political consequences.”56 Profound changes in warfare can come
in periods of technological stagnation, and technology
does not inevitably have near-term effects. In the long
run, technological change may shape the nature of
war, but the long run may be a very long time.
This debate is relevant when examining change in
the U.S. Army in the 1970s for several reasons. First of
all, Army leaders sought to interpret the significance
of technological trends in this period as these trends
became evident through both research activities and
in actual operations. One example of the latter was
U.S. General William E. DePuy’s analysis of what he
perceived as a new lethality on the battlefield made
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evident by tremendous losses during the 1973 October
War in the Middle East.57 A second reason is the importance of the Gulf War as a key event that showed
the increased levels of effectiveness that U.S. Armed
Forces had achieved over preceding decades. Some,
such as William Perry, believed that the scale and low
cost of the victory were primarily due to technological
advantage.58 Undoubtedly, technological advantage
played a substantial role, but focusing solely on it
leaves out the attributes of the organizations that enabled them to exploit advanced technologies. Without
denying that technological change has an impact, the
main point here is that this does not occur in any sort
of inevitable or straightforward way. Much will depend on the individual organization’s ability to create
new operational concepts and perhaps new organizations in order to exploit the change.59 This suggests the
importance of strong integration in an army’s doctrine
and training. Changes in each of these areas, as well as
in other management systems, were important components of the U.S. Army’s 1970s reforms.
THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH
The previous two sections established the importance of military change, explained why it is difficult
to institute, and reviewed existing approaches to the
problem. The argument here is that the change that
took place in the Army between the end of the Vietnam War and the 1991 Persian Gulf War is not readily
explained through a focus on a particular innovation,
doctrinal change alone, the civil-military relations
nexus, or advances in technology. Instead, it was the
product of interrelated reforms in the following areas:
personnel management, professional military educa-
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tion, training philosophy and execution, doctrinal developments, and modernization. The specific reforms
were not in and of themselves revolutionary. Instead,
they were incremental improvements adopted to
overcome identified deficiencies. In some cases, these
reforms required the initiation of new programs, but
these programs did not change the organization’s core
task. It was the combination of these reforms, and the
links among them, which were essential to changes in
the U.S. Army that began in the 1970s.
An explanation of organizational change in this
period, therefore, requires an explanation of the various reforms that in combination produced it, as well
an explanation of the links that were forged among
them. Unfortunately for the sake of simplicity, the different reforms were not produced by exactly the same
dynamics. One challenging aspect of the literature on
military change is that the conclusions of different
scholars vary widely. Here I will organize these issues
into three debates. First, who initiates reform? More
specifically, do civilian political leaders or military organizational leaders play the key role? Second, what
motivates reform? Third, what differentiates merely
attempted reforms from those that have an impact?
This section will explore these questions.
Who Initiates Reform?
As discussed above, there are a variety of impediments to changing military institutions. Recognizing
this to be the case, one possible conclusion is that
change can only come from without. This is essentially
Barry Posen’s perspective as presented in The Sources
of Military Doctrine. He argues that military innovation occurs when civilian leaders are motivated to get
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involved and institute change.60 Posen recognizes that
civilians may not always have the expertise necessary
to directly implement changes, and therefore argues
that they will find a compensating source of military
knowledge in either a competing service or “mavericks”—rebels within military organizations.61
Other scholars have disagreed with the central role
Posen gives to civilian political leaders. Rosen argues,
for example, that senior military leaders with traditional credentials in their services drive successful innovations. Rosen also argues that military mavericks
are unlikely to be effective agents of innovation, since
their very status as mavericks makes it impossible for
them to garner the organizational authority needed to
implement change.62 In basic agreement, Kier points
out that “civilian intervention is unusual” in the development of doctrine, and suggests that civilian
political decisions instead shape the environment in
which military choices are made.63 Avant, like Rosen
and Kier, ascribes primary responsibility for the detailed development of doctrine to military leaders.64
Given these differing perspectives, one dispute in
the literature is over the identity of the key agent of
change. The case examined here supports those in the
latter school of thought since military leaders were the
crucial developers of the reforms which were implemented in the U.S. Army in the 1970s and early 1980s.
What Motivates Change?
There are two possible sources of motivation for
change in a military organization—external and internal. When examining external sources, there are
again two broad spheres that should be considered.
In distinguishing between them, it is valuable to use
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Kenneth Waltz’s concept of levels of analysis. Spurs
to change that come from outside an organization can
be categorized as third image sources stemming from
the international system or second image sources
stemming from the domestic environment.65 There are
contrasting perspectives as to the relative importance
of these levels of analysis, as well as disagreements
about which factors within them matter most.
Turning first to Waltz’s third image and the international system, Posen argues that military change occurs when changes in the international environment
drive civilians to intervene in military affairs and
institute change.66 What matters most is the international balance of power. A second possibility—which
does not necessarily rely on the direct and detailed intervention of political leaders—is that military leaders
respond to shifts in the national security strategy as
developed and articulated by political leaders.67 This
second view gives weight to the international system in that the international environment is likely to
impact on political leaders’ development of national
security strategy.68 However, civilian influence on the
accompanying changes in military organizations is
not necessarily direct.
There are two other ways of capturing the potential effect of developments in the international system
on military change that rely more on an independent
evaluation by military officers rather than civilian involvement. The first, developed by Rosen, suggests
that key military leaders respond not so much to civilian direction, as to structural characteristics of the
security environment. In his words,
The international security environment is composed
of those factors not under the control of either the
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United States military or the government of hostile
powers but that constrain or create opportunities for
the military. Technological revolutions outside the
control of the military, such as the invention of the
airplane, or large changes in the international role of
the United States, such as the nation’s emergence as
a Pacific power after the acquisition of the Philippine
Islands, have triggered peacetime innovation.69

Kimberly Zisk provides a second perspective that
also emphasizes independent military evaluations,
but she focuses on threat. Zisk argues that military
officers should be viewed as national security professionals who seek to ensure the state’s security through
their analysis of potential future adversaries.70 Senior
military officers are capable of learning from, and will
respond to, changes in rivals’ military postures. Posen
also acknowledges the possibility that militaries will
learn from foreign developments. However, he takes
a more skeptical approach by restricting this exception to the idea that militaries may respond to either
their own experiences or those of client states.71 Both
Zisk and Posen argue that military officers are more
likely to respond to foreign developments that they
see as being relevant to the success of their own current plans.
Shifting now to Waltz’s second image but still looking outside the organization, the initiators of change
may respond to factors that stem from within the state.
As one example, Kier argues that when civilian political leaders make decisions that shape military policy,
they are more likely to prioritize the domestic—rather
than the international—balance of power.72 Similarly,
Avant argues, “We should not necessarily expect to
see civilian leaders as unitary actors pursuing the best
interest of their country in the international realm. We
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should expect them to behave as strategic political
players who act first to ensure that they will stay in
power.”73 An actor’s protection of his or her status in
the domestic political game is an important source of
motivation for actions of many types—including the
formulation of military policy. This insight is valuable in the case examined here. For example, one of
the most important political decisions which shaped
the course of the U.S. Army’s reforms in the 1970s was
the political decision to go to an all-volunteer manpower policy. This decision, announced by candidate
Richard Nixon during the 1968 presidential election,
had more to do with Nixon’s relationship with the
American electorate than with a desire to improve the
effectiveness of the U.S. military.
Turning to organization theory, James G. March
and Herbert A. Simon suggest additional possibilities. They argue in their classic work on organizations
that “the rate of innovation is likely to increase when
changes in the environment make the existing organizational procedures unsatisfactory.”74 When hypothesizing about potential domestic influences on change,
it is useful to combine March and Simon’s observation
with insights from organization theorists who have focused on the importance of the resource dependence
of organizations. These theorists expect managers to
actively “seek to increase power over critical aspects
of the environment.”75 This suggests that military leaders would seek to shape the resources that political
leaders decide to provide them. In some circumstances, change could be a means to this end. This chain
of reasoning suggests that military leaders would be
more likely to institute reforms when such reforms
were necessary to secure the organization’s supply of
critical resources.76 Although these resources could be
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material, organizational leaders may also attempt to
reinforce the social legitimacy of their organizations
as either an end in itself, or as a means to strengthen
claims on material resources.77
A second proposition that can be drawn from organization theory is that organizational leaders will
strive to reduce uncertainty. It was noted above that
some analysts, such as Allison and Zelikow and Posen, derive from this the idea that organizations will
tend to stagnate when left on their own. However, this
is not necessarily the case. In his book, Organizations in
Action, James Thompson argues that it is useful to take
a level of analysis approach to organizations. At their
core, organizations are focused on performing their
technical functions. In a military context, this could be
taken to consist of the operations of warfighting units.
At a second managerial level, the focus is on servicing these technical suborganizations by mediating between them and their customers, and by ensuring the
receipt of adequate resources. A crucial responsibility
of the managerial level is to enable the elements of the
organization operating on the technical level to fulfill
their functions by reducing uncertainty in their environments.78 As in the case of resources, this suggests
that military leaders would be more likely to introduce
reforms when these reforms reduce uncertainty in the
organization’s environment. This does not mean that
there is a direct relationship between an organizational desire to reduce uncertainty and a specific policy—
such as a preference for offensive doctrines.79 The particular policies that will meet organizational needs for
uncertainty reduction are context dependent.80
In sum, change could be motivated by both foreign and domestic developments external to military
organizations. The characteristics of the international
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environment that may be important include shifts in
the balance of power, structural characteristics of the
security environment, or the activities and postures of
foreign militaries. Within the state, political leaders
may impact on military reform as they make policies
with an eye to their domestic political situation. Finally, organizational leaders may be motivated to attempt
reforms when such actions help them to secure critical
organizational resources or reduce uncertainty.
In addition to external sources, organizations may
be driven to embark on reforms by internal developments. The most common proposition here is that
reform will be motivated by dramatic performance
failure. As two examples, Posen and Allison and Zelikow suggest that organizational failures may drive
reform in organizations in which continuity is otherwise expected.81 In response, Rosen has pointed out
that failure may just lead to more failure, and that lack
of success does not necessarily indicate directions for
positive future development.82 Nevertheless, since
this idea is so common in the literature it should be
kept in mind.83
A second possibility, which draws again from Simon and March’s work, requires less drastic disasters
to inspire change. Simon and March argue that innovation may be spurred by organizational performance
that falls below established standards.84 Their analysis
suggests that military leaders would embark on reforms when internal review processes identify performance that does not meet current levels of acceptability. This perspective serves as a corrective to the overly
stagnant and regimented portraits sometimes painted
of the performance of large organizations and the individuals within them. As March writes in a different
article, “Change takes place because most of the time
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most people in an organization do about what they
are supposed to do; that is they are intelligently attentive to their environments and their jobs.”85 To the
extent that key reforms can be explained as stemming
from this process, this routine conscientious behavior
takes on added significance.
Institutionalization.
For reforms to have an impact, they must become
embedded in an organization’s ways of doing business. In the case of innovation, for example, Rosen argues that new ways of warfare must have supporting
organizational dimensions. Especially important are
promotion pathways that allow specialists in the new
way of warfare the possibility of a promising career.
Rosen’s analysis points out the importance of using
incentive structures to align individual and organizational goals when attempting to change large institutions.86 It also valuably highlights the importance of
the process of institutionalization to military change.
The Argument.
This section has touched on three issues that are
central to understanding military reform. The first of
these is a debate over whether civilian political leaders or military officers are the central figures in the
process of military reform. Early and influential work
argued that military change requires civilian intervention. However, other scholars have pointed out that
the role of civilian policymakers in changing military
institutions is constrained by expertise and by competing demands. The case examined here supports the
latter school of thought. Political leaders may affect
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pace and priority, but rarely determine the content of
reforms in any degree of detail.
The second issue relates to the source of reform—
what spurs military organizations to change? Possible
motivators include changes in the international system, characteristics of the domestic environment, and
internal diagnostics. Although various scholars have
prioritized one or another of these factors, none of
them necessarily dominates. As is evident in the history of the U.S. Army in the 1970s and early 1980s, the
weight of these factors varies. Political leaders act in
accordance with their interpretation of the demands
of the international system, but also take into account
domestic politics. Military leaders respond to all of
the following: civilian decisions about military policy,
changes in the potential threat, and developments
within their own organizations. A general pattern is
that civilian policy decisions provide the parameters
within which militaries operate. The manner in which
military leaders respond to these constraints, as well
as to factors such as the threat, is usually a product of
analyses that occur within military organizations.
A final component of the argument about reform
relates to institutionalization. Rosen argues that innovations must be backed up by changes in personnel policies in order to be successful. The dynamics
revealed by the case examined here build upon this
insight. Reforms are most likely to be successful when
changes in doctrine, personnel policies, training, professional education, and modernization are integrated
and mutually supporting. For this to happen, there
must be a single organizational entity with broad authority over the entire organization that is capable of
creating, critically analyzing, and implementing a coherent program of reform. This process takes a long
time—at least a decade and probably longer.
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The remainder of this monograph examines the essential reforms which were implemented in the U.S.
Army beginning in the 1970s. The sections below are
focused on the key decisionmakers in a particular time
period or within core issue areas. After an examination of the major developments of this important case,
this monograph concludes by summarizing findings
and addressing implications of this work.87
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE 1970s AND 1980s
In the late 1960s, the U.S. Army faced a broad range
of challenges which came from external sources as
well as from within. In the executive branch, President
Richard Nixon promulgated the “Nixon Doctrine”
and a new national security strategy of “realistic deterrence” with important implications for the Army’s
future. The Nixon Doctrine emphasized burden-sharing and reduced involvement in helping other states
provide for their own security as the Nixon administration focused on reducing government spending
and inflation.88 Under realistic deterrence, the country
had to be prepared to fight one and one-half wars at a
time (a major war as well as a contingency operation
elsewhere) rather than the previous two and one-half
wars requirement.89 As interpreted by Secretary of the
Army Stanley Resor, the Nixon Doctrine and strategy
of realistic deterrence meant that the Army would
be smaller and receive fewer resources. The Army
would need to strike a new balance between continued forward presence in places such as Europe and
Korea and an increased emphasis on allies contributing more to their own defense.90 Even more important in terms of its impact on the Army was President
Nixon’s decision to move to an all-volunteer force. His
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first statements of intent were in the 1968 campaign;
by 1971 this significant change had been expressed in
legislation by Congress. The Army’s environment was
also shaped by Congress’ reassertion of its powers
relative to the executive branch. Congressional resurgence meant that the Army would have to respond to
two sets of political superiors who could not be presumed to agree.91 Finally, the domestic environment
was characterized by sometimes violent social turbulence, to include urban riots, demonstrations spurred
by unresolved issues of race discrimination and equal
rights, and an active anti-war movement.
By the late 1960s, the Army also faced great internal challenges as the Vietnam War had placed great
strain on the entire force. The political decision made
early on to fight the war using only the active Army
meant that the Army had to become much larger. Between early 1965 and mid 1968, the Army expanded
from a size of 973,000 Soldiers and 16 2/3 divisions
to 1,570,000 Soldiers and 19 2/3 divisions. By July
1968, the equivalent of nine divisions, approximately
355,000 Soldiers, had been sent to Vietnam and the
commitment was still growing. Because of the need
for leaders, commissioned and noncommissioned officer (NCO) promotions were accelerated and average
experience levels decreased. The decision not to mobilize the reserves also interacted with the decisions
to give Vietnam top priority in resources and to restrict hardship tours by creating skill mismatches and
personnel turbulence that reached an annual turnover
that “approximated 100 percent—80 percent in units
stationed in Europe, but 120 percent in those in the
United States.”92 This turbulence degraded the ability of leaders to create cohesive units—both in Vietnam and throughout the rest of the Army. Finally,
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the Army’s equipment procurement was limited to
what would be needed in a post-Vietnam Army. This
had ripple effects throughout the force, as the forces
in Vietnam received equipment from the rest of the
Army and were the priority for new acquisitions. In
combination, personnel challenges and equipment
shortfalls severely degraded the Army’s motivation
and capabilities.
Westmoreland’s Watch, 1968-72.
General William Westmoreland became the Chief
of Staff of the Army on July 3, 1968. While the first
year of his 4-year tour was devoted to operations in
Vietnam, he spent his last 3 years in office focused on
rebuilding the post-war Army. The challenges and
constraints he faced included the following: sustaining operations in Vietnam while withdrawing forces
and drawing down the Army; managing a declining
budget; dealing with delayed equipment modernization; responding to allegations of war crimes by U.S.
soldiers in Vietnam and other ethical scandals; counteracting an increase in social problems in the Army
in the areas of dissent, racial friction, and substance
abuse; and transitioning to an all-volunteer Army at
a time when popular support for the Army was low.93
A primary means through which Westmoreland
responded to these challenges was to commission various studies to identify problems within the Army and
recommend solutions.94 The transition to an all-volunteer force was a special priority given that the Army
was the service most dependent on the draft for its
manpower. The supply of this crucial resource would
be threatened by an end to draft calls in 1973 unless
actions were quickly taken. In addition to commis-
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sioning studies in this area, Westmoreland created the
Office of the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army (SAMVA), appointed a three-star general
to serve as the SAMVA, and gave this office authority
to coordinate necessary steps across all of the Army’s
staff sections. This office also had the authority to experiment with programs designed to increase service
attractiveness.
The focus of Westmoreland’s reforms was what
he termed “professionalism,” which he said involved
“training, education, and individual and organizational competence.”95 Changes designed to enhance
professionalism were also intended to promote the
success of the all-volunteer Army. Since Westmoreland was not particularly a fan of the all-volunteer concept, the focus on professionalism allowed him to get
behind this civilian policy decision while at the same
time making organizational changes that he felt were
essential anyway. Some of his more important reforms
included: decentralizing training and making improvements in training techniques; putting into place
the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS);
centralizing enlisted assignments and promotions at
the grade of E-5 (Sergeant) and above; making minor
improvements to the Officer Education System (OES);
and, most importantly, establishing the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES).
Spurs to change came from several sources. The
pressure that civilian policymakers placed on the
Army by deciding to move to an all-volunteer force
was the most significant external impetus for change.
However, the need for these reforms was also made
evident by internal Army studies. Westmoreland’s
program of reform achieved coherence when he was
able to bring together the reforms internal studies had
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identified as necessary and the external imperative to
attract and retain volunteers. With regard to the argument here, the important point is that the specific
characteristics of various reforms were determined
within the Army.
These changes were significant. Adjustments to
officer and enlisted personnel management policies
decreased turbulence in the Army and facilitated the
development of expertise. Changes in training philosophy and management were early precursors to the
rise of performance-oriented training methods later
in the decade. Finally, the most momentous change
was the establishment of the NCOES. It would be difficult to overstate the importance of this reform. As
explained by General Bruce Palmer, Jr., then the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army,
The key to our success and to the quality of our postVietnam force is the small-unit leader: the junior officer
and noncommissioned officer, the people who have
the closest, most direct contact with the soldier, the
people who get the job done. . . . The Army is people—
young people—some 54 percent are under 23 years of
age. . . . In the final analysis, “face-to-face,” day-to-day
leadership of these young soldiers will determine the
success of our efforts to revitalize the Army and build
a leaner, more professional, quality force.96

To be able to conduct quality individual and small
unit training, and to motivate volunteer soldiers,
NCOs would need to have adequate tactical, technical, and leadership abilities. The competence of small
unit leaders was essential in enabling the Army to be
successful as it increasingly emphasized demanding,
quality training throughout the 1970s and beyond.
The same basic NCOES is still in existence today.
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The Abrams/Weyand Period, 1972-76.
After a delay in his confirmation during which
General Bruce Palmer, Jr., served as Chief of Staff,
General Creighton Abrams became Chief of Staff of
the Army on October 12, 1972. The challenges and
constraints that Abrams faced included: articulating
a role for the Army under the Nixon Doctrine; completing troop withdrawals from Vietnam; managing
declining budgets and personnel downsizing; ensuring the successful achievement of end strength under
the all-volunteer force; managing delayed equipment
modernization; and improving generally low military
readiness across the force with particular problems
in the forces forward deployed in Europe. Although
Abrams’ tenure as Chief of Staff was cut short by a
fatal bout with cancer in 1974, his successor, General
Fred C. Weyand, continued to further Abrams’ key
initiatives.97
A number of important reforms had their origin
in the Abrams period. First, Abrams supported Westmoreland’s earlier sanctioning of a plan to restructure
the existing Continental Army Command (CONARC)
and Combat Developments Command (CDC) into
the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
and Forces Command (FORSCOM). The creation of
TRADOC gave one command (and its four-star commander) unified responsibility for training, teaching,
and developing the Army in terms of equipment, doctrine, and force structure. Second, Abrams increased
the number of divisions within the Army from 13 to 16
without an increase in end strength. This had the effect
of increasing the “tooth-to-tail” ratio in the Army, and
increasing reliance on the total force concept by mov-
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ing critical functions to the reserves. Third, Abrams focused Army modernization on the “Big Five” weapon
systems. The “Big Five” were the M1 Abrams Tank,
the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Apache Helicopter,
the Blackhawk Helicopter, and the Patriot Air Defense
Missile. In an era of very constrained resources, this is
perhaps best understood as an effort to focus limited
research and development dollars on key systems.
When resources became available in the 1980s, these
programs then provided the focus for expanded procurement.
General Abrams’s key decisions can generally
be understood as an effort to achieve stability in the
Army’s resources so that an effective Army could be
rebuilt. The decision to reorganize the Army in the
continental United States was primarily driven by assessments that CONARC was an unwieldy organization whose broad span of control prevented it from
doing any task well. However, this reorganization
also enabled Abrams to establish himself as a sound
manager of resources and enhanced the Army’s credibility with civilian policymakers through a reorganization that saved money and reduced headquarters
personnel. The decision to increase the force structure
to 16 divisions was also at least partially motivated
by the impact it would have on the relationship between the Army and its political masters. First, this
force structure change increased the “tooth-to-tail”
ratio in the Army, which indicated greater efficiency
to some civilian leaders at the time. In addition, 16 divisions was a hedge against additional cuts in force
strength. The Army had been in a free fall in terms of
end strength, dropping from 1.57 million in 1968 to
783,000 in 1974. Abrams negotiated an arrangement
with Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger that the
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Army could keep any efficiencies achieved under a
constant end strength of 785,000.98 Schlesinger would
then defend this figure before Congress. This finally
gave the Army some stability around which it could
effectively plan.99 Finally, a focus on the “Big Five”
was a wise approach to prioritizing research and development during a time of extremely constrained resources. Nevertheless, during this period modernization continued to suffer.
One overarching commonality between the Westmoreland and Abrams and Weyand periods is that
these three leaders all felt an imperative need to “save”
an Army that was in trouble. Westmoreland placed
his emphasis on personnel matters and on improving
the Army’s professionalism. The single greatest challenge Westmoreland tackled was the transition to an
all-volunteer manpower policy. While challenges in
this area remained, Abrams and Weyand focused on
achieving stability for the Army and ensuring that it
was organized to be able to handle future challenges. In combination, the efforts of these leaders were
complementary in aiding the Army’s recovery from
the trauma associated with its rapid expansion and
contraction, social problems, and other difficulties
during the Vietnam War. In sum, these leaders laid
the groundwork for future progress.
Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-82.
The first two commanders of TRADOC were General William E. DePuy (1973-77) and General Donn
A. Starry (1977-81). Constraints during this period
included the priority on achieving a 16-division force
in the early years and constrained training resources
throughout the period. Nevertheless, the key story
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here is one of resources rather than constraints. TRADOC commanders had both the institutional charter
and resources to develop new training philosophies,
create new military doctrine, and ensure that training, doctrine, leader development, material, and the
development of organizational structures received a
new level of integration.
As its first commander, General DePuy played a
vital role in interpreting TRADOC’s responsibilities
and setting priorities. DePuy particularly emphasized
the following: the analytical function of TRADOC;
partnership with the U.S. Air Force; liaison efforts
with the German Army; and the relationship between
TRADOC and FORSCOM. Imbued with a sense of urgency, DePuy played a strong, personal role in TRADOC’s early reforms. As a result, his longstanding
emphasis on the tactical competence of the Army’s
leaders received great attention.100
DePuy’s successor, General Starry, had worked
closely with DePuy before becoming TRADOC’s second commanding general. The two generals agreed
on a broad range of issues, to include the importance
of TRADOC’s analytical work as well as the organization’s relationships with outside entities. Perhaps
the greatest difference was in the realm of doctrinal
development. Whereas DePuy personally wrote portions of the capstone manual produced during his
tenure—and closely supervised the rest—Starry deliberately exercised a greater degree of delegation.
Starry believed that a more inclusive process would
produce doctrine with a higher level of acceptance by
the Army as a whole.101
Key reforms in the DePuy and Starry periods included an emphasis on using military doctrine to
drive change in Army force development and op-
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erations and a strong focus on performance-oriented
individual and unit training. As General Starry later
reflected, “I believe doctrine should drive everything
else.”102 Especially important was the linkage between
doctrine and unit training forged by the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The ARTEP
created incentives for units to become competent at
executing Army doctrine.103 The renewed emphasis
on meaningful and challenging unit training was also
evident in the development of combat training centers
in which units could test their skills in realistic settings against skilled opposing forces.104 The role that
the training centers would eventually come to play in
improving the Army’s warfighting ability was particularly evident in the wake of the war against Iraq
in 1991. As articulated in the DoD report to Congress
on the conduct of the war, “many of the soldiers had
been to the armored warfare training at Fort Irwin,
California, which has been described as tougher than
anything the troops ran into in Iraq.”105
In addition to what were probably the two most
important areas of reform, doctrine and training,
TRADOC played an essential role in the U.S. Army’s
post-Vietnam recovery by fulfilling its potential as an
integrator of key developments. As recounted in a
TRADOC official history:
What was new in the idea of a training and doctrine
command was focus. The TRADOC-FORSCOM arrangement solved the span-of-control problem, put
combat developments back into the schools, and focused the development of the Army’s tactical organizations, weapons and equipment, doctrine, and the
training of soldiers in that doctrine, in one command.106
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The span-of-control problem was solved in the
sense that TRADOC was relieved of the responsibility that CONARC had held for operational readiness
of active army and reserve component units within
the United States. In addition, important functions
which needed a unified approach were put under one
commander. Key to TRADOC’s effectiveness was the
progress that it made in coherently linking developments in doctrine, training, leader development, materiel, and organizations.
The need for these reforms stemmed from a combination of problems identified through internal studies, the personal experiences of key leaders, and the
observation of foreign military developments—particularly the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Military leaders
primarily determined the specific shapes that these
reforms took. The reforms built upon earlier changes
which reorganized the Army within the United States
and gave it stability in end strength. TRADOC also
built upon and integrated earlier reforms in the areas
of personnel management, professional training and
education, and equipment modernization.
The U.S. Army’s reforms in the 1970s and early
1980s were mutually reinforcing and cumulative in
their impact. The reforms of the Westmoreland and
Abrams periods were important to the U.S. Army’s recovery after Vietnam. During Westmoreland’s tenure,
the Army focused on professionalism issues, sought
to reduce turbulence in the force, and took steps towards making the all-volunteer Army a success that
had long term pay-offs. Two measures that were particularly important were early efforts to improve training, and the establishment of the NCOES. Abrams and
Weyand, in their turn, stabilized the Army, organized
it for the future, and planned for its modernization.
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TRADOC, under its first two commanding generals,
then built upon these reforms by transforming the
U.S. Army’s preparation for future conflict.
CONCLUSION
The experience of the Army in the 1970s and 1980s
bears out several aspects of the argument made here
about military reform. Though the particular factors which serve as a spur to military reform vary,
the pattern that civilian decisionmakers provide the
parameters within which military leaders craft their
detailed reform programs holds. The second issue is
the importance of a comprehensive, integrated, and
critically analyzed program of reform. Crucial to the
Army’s successful change during this period was the
existence of TRADOC as a single organizational entity capable of crafting a comprehensive program of
reform and possessed of the authority to implement
it. A final issue is that of time. The rebuilding of the
Army after the Vietnam War and its transformation
into an effective instrument of high intensity conflict
took several decades to complete.
Before concluding, it is worth addressing two important criticisms that have been levied against the
transformation of the U.S. Army in the 1970s and
1980s. The first is that the Army’s leadership was professionally delinquent in failing to retain what it had
learned about counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam
and in building a force that was overly optimized toward one threat scenario—major conventional warfare in Europe.107 Though this charge has merit, the
decision of the senior leaders of the Army at the time
to focus on high intensity conflict is understandable.
As General Starry later explained:

46

So, in the context of 1970-1973—times of social, political and economic upheaval in our society—what did
we see for our country and our Army as we tried to
look ahead? We saw the possibility of two wars: mechanized war—such as we might have to fight in NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Europe—perhaps even in the Middle East; the other war—a Korea,
a Vietnam, a Lebanon crisis, a Dominican Republic.
Each war obviously would require different kinds of
forces—mechanized on the one hand, light infantry on
the other. . . . With the Nixon doctrine beginning to
reaffirm our national interest in Western Europe, our
military focus narrowed to NATO. . . . So, we decided to begin with developing operational concepts to
cope with our most difficult problem, the mechanized
war.108

The decision to follow the guidance established by
the country’s political leaders to focus on Europe—a
decision which also met many of the Army’s institutional needs—was not unquestionably correct but it
was certainly defensible given the context of the times.
What may be more appropriately subject to criticism
is the relatively slow adaptation of the U.S. Army in
later periods—particularly after the end of the Cold
War—given new strategic and operational realities in
the 1990s.
A second major possible criticism is that the transformation of the 1970s and 1980s helped to produce an
Army more capable of tactical and operational excellence, but also one that was deficient in strategic thinking; in other words, deficient in the intellectually challenging process of critically linking military means to
policy ends.109 Again, this critique has merit. As the
first Commanding General of TRADOC, General William DePuy was focused on creating an Army able to
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survive the first battle of the next war so that ultimate
victory would be possible. A World War II veteran of
a division that had suffered horrendous casualties,
he was also determined to correct what he viewed as
a longstanding deficiency in the technical and tactical competence of officers to fulfill their immediate
responsibilities.110 That this focus on the immediate
utility of professional training, and an emphasis on
training versus education, was ameliorated somewhat
after DePuy’s tenure is best exemplified in the creation
of the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)
at Fort Leavenworth in 1982. As the Army’s capstone
doctrine in the 1980s came to focus more on the operational level of war, SAMS was established explicitly to
prepare officers to serve at this level.
While it is true that the Army emphasized tactical
and operational excellence during this period, criticism of this focus has often been poorly directed. The
reforms in training, education, and personnel policies were arguably necessary in an Army seeking to
restore its professionalism and preparing to defend
against a very real and capable conventional opponent
in Europe. A better criticism may be that the Army did
not adequately continue to build on its progress and
come up with robust, explicit educational programs
designed to foster a comparable level of talent for strategic thinking and an appreciation for the need to link
military means to policy ends. In retrospect, it is hard
to look back on the progress that was made in technical and tactical expertise and proficiency and argue
that these gains were not beneficial. It may be better
to acknowledge that they were simply not sufficient.
As of this writing, the U.S. Army is again in a period of uncertainty about its future. As its strategic
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leaders strive to shape the future force, this study
suggests several questions that may usefully guide
the approach. What are the key constraints or parameters that civilian policymakers have established for
uniformed military leaders? Do the political and uniformed leaders have a constructive relationship which
facilitates the implementation of a coherent program
of change? Is there an integrated approach that reaches into all key areas of force development and guides
them in ways that are integrated and mutually reinforcing? Is there an organizational entity empowered
and capable of being the focal point for establishing
coherence in developments ranging from equipment
modernization and doctrine to training and education? Knowing the answers to these questions would
enable informed judgment about the prospects for
success. The consequences, for good or for ill, could
be quite significant in terms of resources, lives, and
the national interest.
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